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 1 
TWO-LEVEL GAMES BEYOND THE UNITED STATES: 
INTERNATIONAL INDEXING IN BRITAIN DURING THE 
WARS IN AFGHANISTAN, IRAQ AND LIBYA 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Britain experienced a minor political crisis shortly before the 2003 Iraq War. US 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told Washington reporters that Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
domestic difficulties might prevent British troops taking part in the invasion. No matter, 
Rumsfeld argued. The US could and would proceed alone. It was a throwaway remark. It was 
also true. But the British media, British parliamentarians and British public opinion reacted 
badly. Angry newspaper columnists asked why Blair was unnecessarily sacrificing Britain’s 
independence to give the US military support. Rebel MPs demanded he seize the opportunity 
Rumsfeld offered, to pull Britain out of the ‘coalition of the willing’ with dignity. Blair 
would rather have avoided the argument, though it did not ultimately change his policy. 
Downing Street Communications Director Alastair Campbell expressed private fury at 
Rumsfeld’s “f***-up”, concluding “he just didn’t get other people’s politics at all”1.  
 Robert Putnam’s “two-level game” model of foreign policy decision making assumes 
the international and domestic bargaining arenas are linked primarily through the person of 
the policymaker2. It allows for “reverberation”, for foreign actors’ statements and actions to 
affect the domestic politics of other states directly3, just as Rumsfeld apparently did, but does 
not discuss in detail how this practically works. Nor does it consider the possibility that 
reverberation varies between states. The fact Rumsfeld did such damage to Blair, but Blair 
                                                        
1 Alastair Campbell and Richard Stott, The Blair Years: Extracts from the Alastair Campbell Diaries (London: 
Arrow Books, 2007), p. 676. 
2 Andrew Moravscik, “Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International 
Bargaining” in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (Eds.), Double-Edged Diplomacy: 
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 16.  
3  Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games”, International 
Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1988), pp. 454-455. 
 2 
could not conceivably have so damaged Rumsfeld, indicates that some variation may in fact 
take place. It indicates that US policymakers may enjoy greater access to and potential 
influence over foreign domestic bargaining arenas than counterparts in other states.  
 This article uses an innovative application of the media studies ‘indexing’ hypothesis 
to suggest that reverberation matters more beyond the United States, and that US leaders 
enjoy disproportionate access to foreign domestic bargaining games. Indexing arises when 
journalists attempt to meet their professional commitments to balance and objectivity by 
reporting the views of political actors in rough proportion to their perceived ability to 
influence events4. Most indexing studies focus on domestic politics5. But the same forces 
should apply when journalists report on events overseas. If they care about balance and 
objectivity they should ‘index’ their coverage of international affairs in rough proportion to 
how powerful they consider statespersons to be. The media in less powerful states should, in 
other words, pay greater attention to foreign leaders than does the media in more powerful 
states. In Putnam’s terms, weaker states should experience more reverberation than stronger 
states. Recent research in the US demonstrates that foreign actors can gain access to domestic 
media and can influence both public opinion and domestic politics6. This article builds on 
these findings by looking beyond the US.  
 The following analysis investigates variation in reverberation between the United 
States and United Kingdom during three recent joint military actions. The first section 
                                                        
4 Lance Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations in the United States”, Journal of Communication, 
Vol. 40, No. 2 (1990), p. 106.  
5 See for example L. Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations”, op. cit., John Zaller and Dennis 
Chiu, “Government’s Little Helper: US Press Coverage of Foreign Policy Crises, 1945-1991”, Political 
Communication, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), pp. 385-405, Scott Althaus, Jill Edy, Robert Entman and Patricia 
Phalen, “Revising the Indexing Hypothesis: Officials, media and the Libya crisis”, Political Communication, 
Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996), pp. 407-421.  
6 Danny Hayes and Matt Guardino, Influence from Abroad: Foreign Voices, the Media and US Public Opinion 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), “The Influence of Foreign Voices on US Public Opinion”, 
American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 4 (2011), pp. 830-850, “Whose Views Made the News? 
Media Coverage and the March to War in Iraq”, Political Communication, Vol. 27, No. 1 (2010), pp. 59-87, 
Shoon Murray, “Broadening the Debate About War: The Inclusion of Foreign Critics in Media Coverage and its 
Potential Impact on US Public Opinion”, Foreign Policy Analysis, Vol. 10, No. 4 (2014), pp. 329-350. 
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establishes the theoretical relationship between a state’s position in the international power 
hierarchy, journalistic practices and the impact of reverberation upon the two-level game. 
The second section sets up a three-part case study comparing US and UK media coverage of 
joint military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. It introduces elements of both cross-
time and cross-national comparison, while recognising the unusual nature of the US-UK 
relationship. The third section presents results which suggest that the indexing effect does 
have an international dimension resulting in different levels of reverberation between states. 
Further research will be needed to show if this arises beyond the US-UK case, but in this 
instance UK newspapers covered US leaders more frequently than US newspapers did UK 
leaders. The final section highlights how considering the operation of two-level games in 
states other than the US both improves the theory and highlights a degree of ‘boundedness’ in 
US FPA. Putnam quite rightly downplayed reverberation because it is of limited significance 
in the US. But it takes on much greater significance once we shift our focus to other states, 
and the variation is important. US leaders are better able to influence foreign domestic 
bargaining than their counterparts overseas.  
 
POWER, PRESS AND POLITICS 
 
The different rules of domestic games 
 
 Putnam’s original model bucked the trend amongst International Relations scholars 
for ignoring domestic, “second-image” explanations in favour of “systemic” accounts of 
international phenomena 7 . Though he left the formal modelling for later applications 8 , 
                                                        
7 Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954) p. 81, Theory of 
International Politics (Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1979), pp. 79-101. 
8 Keisuke Iida, “Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games”, Public Choice, Vol. 89, No. 3/4 (1996), pp. 283-
303, “When and How do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3 (1993), pp. 403-426, Jongryn Mo, “Domestic Institutions and International 
Bargaining: The Role of Agent Veto in Two-Level Games”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 89, No. 4 
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Putnam nevertheless explained in parsimonious terms why understanding foreign policy 
requires understanding the international and the domestic arenas simultaneously9. Unlike 
neoclassical realists, who use domestic-level intervening variables to qualify structural 
explanations10, Putnam argued that statesmen are also domestic politicians. They have to 
negotiate internationally while at the same time pursuing domestic ratification for any 
agreements11. They cannot pursue optimal strategies at either level for fear of triggering 
serious costs at the other.  
 In its most basic form, the two-level game model describes how national leaders  must 
secure agreements with foreign counterparts and win domestic approval in real time. It 
approximates the workings of the US system of government fairly well, though Putnam 
insisted his account represented an ideal type of potential use elsewhere 12 . Subsequent 
empirical studies highlighted two key variations among non-US states that shape domestic 
bargaining dynamics. Both fit with Putnam’s underlying approach while modifying parts of 
it. To begin with, different constitutional arrangements affect how influential domestic 
opposition can be13. The US constitution ensures a level of legislative involvement in major 
foreign policy decisions. Other states have different arrangements 14. Britain’s parliament 
                                                                                                                                                                            
(1995), pp. 914-924, “The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions”, Journal of 
Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 3 (1994), pp. 402-422. 
9 Putnam, op. cit., p. 427. 
10 Gideon Rose, “Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy”, World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (1998), 
pp. 144-172, Steven Lobell, Norrin Ripsman, and Jeffrey Taliaferro, Neoclassical Realism, the State and 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
11 Putnam, op. cit., p. 431. 
12 Ibid., pp. 434-436. 
13 Peter Trumbore, “Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games 
in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 42, No. 3 (1998), p. 545, Ahmer Tarar, 
“International Bargaining with Two-Sided Domestic Constraints”,  Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 45, No. 
3 (2001), pp. 320-340, Kai Oppermann, “Salience and Sanctions: A Principal-Agent Analysis of Domestic Win-
Sets in Two-Level Games: The Case of British European Policy Under the Blair Government”, Cambridge 
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2008), p. 194. 
14 W. Wagner, D. Peters, and C. Glahn, Parliamentary War Powers Around the World, 1989-2004: A New 
Dataset (Geneva: Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2004). 
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approved military action in Iraq and Libya but not Afghanistan. It seems subsequently to 
have secured a (non-legally binding) veto over future major deployments15.  
 Secondly, different states have different political structures, which in turn create 
distinct bargaining dynamics16. Compared to Putnam’s account, the domestic ratification 
process looks quite different in parliamentary states without a rigid separation between 
executive and legislative branches of government17. In the US domestic bargaining involves 
negotiations between the White House and Congress, whereas in the UK the key exchanges 
take place within parliament. There is even variation between parliamentary states. Despite 
recent fragmentation, Britain’s ‘first-past-the-post’ electoral system still typically produces 
“elected dictatorship”, governments capable of winning House of Commons votes by 
definition 18 . In such a system political leaders spend more time ensuring their party 
colleagues’ support through a combination of discipline and patronage 19  than they do 
winning over opponents20. In states with more proportional electoral systems, coalitions are 
the norm. This means bargaining between political parties but within the government as well 
as between the government and its legislative opposition. This can lead to inertia and 
conservatism, but also extremity21.  
                                                        
15 James Strong, “Why Parliament Now Decides on War: Tracing the Growth of the Parliamentary Prerogative 
Through Syria, Libya and Iraq”, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2015), 
pp. 604-622, “Interpreting the Syria Vote: Parliament and British Foreign Policy”, International Affairs, Vol. 
91, No. 5 (2015) pp. 1123-1139. 
16 Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Public Opinion, Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies”, 
World Politics, Vol. 43, No. 4 (1991), pp. 479-512, Ahmer Tarar, “Constituencies and Preferences in 
International Bargaining”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2005) p. 383. 
17 Robert Pahre, “Endogenous Domestic Institutions in Two-Level Games and Parliamentary Oversight of the 
European Union”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997), p. 148. 
18 Lord Hailsham, “Elected Dictatorship”, The Listener (October 1976), pp, 496-500. 
19 John Huber, “The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies”, American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 90, No. 2 (1996), pp. 269-282, Daniel Diermeir and Timothy Feddersen, “Cohesion in Legislatures and the 
Vote of Confidence Procedure”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 92, No. 3 (1998), pp. 611-621. 
20  Anthony King, “Modes of Executive-Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France and West Germany”, 
Legislative Studies Quarterly, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1976), pp. 705-727. 
21 Juliet Kaarbo, Coalition Politics and Cabinet Decision-Making (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
2012), Ryan Beasley and Juliet Kaarbo, “Explaining Extremity in the Foreign Policies of Parliamentary 
Democracies”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2014), pp. 729-740, Kai Oppermann and Klaus 
Brummer, “Patterns of Junior Party Influence on the Foreign Policy of Coalition Governments”, British Journal 
of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 16, No. 4 (2014) pp. 555-571. 
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Applying the two-level game model to states other than the United States means 
shaping its stipulations to local circumstances, as these studies have done. Putnam quite fairly 
claimed his model represented an ideal type capable of local adaptation. That in turn suggests 
there is merit in highlighting areas where the model’s empirical implications vary, especially 
when that variation is predictable. That is this study’s aspiration.  
 
Reverberation 
 
 The idea that overseas actors can influence domestic political bargaining games is not 
new. Nor is it unusual. Putnam referenced earlier work by Peter Gourevitch22. Gourevitch 
described what he called a “second image reversed” account, highlighting the international 
influences affecting domestic politics 23 . Though he was not primarily concerned with 
individual actors, Gourevitch’s approach did offer a useful early counterpoint to the 
prevailing structural theories of his day. Stephen Walt, meanwhile, regarded what he called 
“penetration” as an important factor in alliance politics24. In Walt’s analysis policymakers 
regularly gain access to and influence over foreign domestic bargaining games in the course 
of alliance-forming and maintenance processes. Though Walt sees penetration as more of a 
consequence than a cause of the international political dynamics he thinks especially 
significant, the emphasis he gives it underlines this article’s wider point that reverberation 
matters. Leonard Schoppa took a more active approach to considering how international 
influences affect domestic politics, and integrated it with the two-level game model. For 
Schoppa, leaders can (and should) use direct access to foreign domestic arenas as leverage at 
                                                        
22 Putnam, op. cit., pp. 430-433. 
23  Peter Gourevitch, “The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics”, 
International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881-912. 
24 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power”, International Security, Vol. 9, No. 4 
(1985), pp. 31-32. 
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the international level 25. He advocates using public diplomacy to reshape a  bargaining 
partner’s domestic win-set, thus shifting their international-level stance. Andrew Moravscik 
similarly noted that while “statesmen have more limited means of influencing foreign win-
sets than domestic ones”, nevertheless “policies aimed at foreign polities are common”26. 
 This article builds on this work by partly explaining how the extent of reverberation 
can vary between states for structural reasons. Gourevitch, like Putnam, does not really 
discuss how and why foreign actors’ influence on a state’s domestic politics might vary. 
Schoppa and Moravscik, meanwhile, present it as a consequence of policymaker choice. 
From this perspective public diplomacy represents one tool among many available to leaders. 
As with every international-level move a leader makes, public diplomacy can echo 
damagingly in the domestic arena of the sending state. A message tailored toward winning 
over the domestic audience of a foreign bargaining partner seems unlikely to appeal to the 
sender’s own constituents. So there are costs associated with directly influencing foreign 
domestic bargaining games. Walt, presents a more structural angle. Unlike Schoppa, 
Moravscik and Putnam, he recognizes that leaders enjoy varying levels of influence over 
foreign domestic politics regardless of their preferences. Unlike Schoppa and Moravscik, he 
does not think individual actors have much choice over the level of influence they enjoy.  
 This article’s focus on reverberation follows Walt’s account of penetration by 
emphasizing the structural drivers of variation in reverberation. At the same time it 
approaches the issue from a quite distinct direction. Walt focuses on the macro picture, on the 
existence of power differentials between states and on the fact of varying levels of domestic 
penetration. This article highlights a possible causal mechanism underpinning this 
relationship. That causal mechanism involves the everyday practices of the domestic news 
                                                        
25 Leonard Schoppa, “Two-Level Games and Bargaining Outcomes: Why Gaiatsu Succeeds in Japan in Some 
Cases but Not Others”, International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), p. 354. 
26 Moravscik, op. cit., p. 29.  
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media, and the access they indirectly provide certain actors to foreign domestic bargaining 
games.  
 
International indexing 
 
  Lance Bennett introduced the concept of “indexing” to the media studies toolkit. 
Bennett argued that journalists seek to demonstrate their independence by balancing the 
views of different sources against each other, but also their credibility by focusing their 
coverage on actors capable of influencing actual events 27 . Actors journalists consider 
powerful benefit from the indexing effect, with those perceived as less influential excluded 
from news coverage28. Indexing usually magnifies the influence of elites. It is not, however, a 
static process. As the balance of power between actors shifts between issues and events, so 
too does their representation in media coverage29. Key members of the governing executive 
naturally dominate news coverage of political matters, since they hold privileged positions in 
the policy decision-making process30. When authoritative elites challenge the official line, 
however, journalists report their views prominently31. Whether indexing helps or hinders 
governments consequently varies from issue to issue and case to case.  
                                                        
27 L. Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations”, op. cit., p. 106. 
28 Robert Entman and Benjamin Page, “The News Before the Storm: The Iraq War Debate and the Limits to 
Media Independence”, in Lance Bennett and David Paletz (eds.), Taken by Storm: The Media, Public Opinion 
and US Foreign Policy in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 97, Lance Bennett, 
“An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representations of Politics”, Political Communication, Vol. 13, No. 
4 (1996), p. 377. 
29 Althaus, et al., op. cit., p. 412 Lance Bennett, Regina Lawrence and Steven Livingston, “None Dare Call it 
Torture: Indexing and the Limits of Press Independence in the Abu Ghraib Scandal”, Journal of 
Communication, Vol. 56, No. 3 (2007), p. 468. 
30  Robert Entman, “Cascading Activation: Contesting the White House's Frame After 9/11”, Political 
Communication, Vol. 20, No. 4 (2003), p. 422, Matthew Baum, “The Iraqi Coalition of the Willing and 
(Politically) Able: Party Systems, the Press, and Public Influence on Foreign Policy”, American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 57, No. 2 (2012) p. 444. 
31 Piers Robinson, “The CNN Effect: Can the News Media Drive Foreign Policy?”, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1999) pp. 301-309, Philip Everts and Pierangelo Isernia, Public Opinion and the 
International Use of Force (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 268, Pippa Norris, Montague Kern and Marion 
Just, Framing Terrorism: The News Media, the Government and the Public, (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 
297-298, Chaim Kaufmann, “Threat Inflation and the Failure of the Marketplace of Ideas: The Selling of the 
Iraq War”, International Security, Vol. 29, No. 1 (2004), p. 44. 
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 Foreign policy analysts, indeed IR scholars in general, traditionally pay little attention 
to communication issues32. Most FPA studies treat news management and public debate as 
peripheral to the real business of policy decision-making33. The same pressures that drive 
indexing in domestic settings should, however, arise when foreign policy is concerned. 
Journalists writing about international affairs should still seek to demonstrate credibility and 
independence, and should still index their coverage as a result. A number of recent studies 
present evidence supporting exactly this hypothesis, and indicating why it might matter in 
policymaking terms. Both Hayes and Guardino and Shoon Murray investigate the influence 
of “voices from abroad” on the domestic politics of foreign policy in the US. Both find that 
US journalists actively seek out overseas voices when domestic elites agree. Both find that 
these voices, when they are reported, can exert a broader domestic political influence34. 
Indexing, in other words, leads to reverberation. Through journalists’ efforts to report the 
views of the most politically influential actors, foreign voices gain access to domestic 
political bargaining games. They can, in certain circumstances, translate that access into 
foreign domestic-level influence.  
 Both Hayes and Guardino and Murray echoed a number of earlier studies that 
suggested the US domestic arena does admit foreign voices35. At the same time, they showed 
only that journalists cite overseas sources to balance to their coverage of domestic elites. 
Where domestic elites disagree over a foreign policy matter, both predict journalists will lose                                                         
32 Jennifer Milliken, “The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods”, 
European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 5, No. 2 (1999), p. 240, Markus Kornprobst, “From Political 
Judgements to Public Justifications (and Vice Versa): How Communities Generate Reasons Upon Which to 
Act”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 1 (2014), pp. 194-195. 
33 Joe Hagan, “Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy”, in Laura Neack, Jeanne Hay 
and Patrick Haney (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis: Continuity and Change in its Second Generation 
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1995), pp. 117-144, Mark Webber and Michael Smith, Foreign Policy in 
a Transformed World (Harlow: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 88, Christopher Hill, The Changing Politics of Foreign 
Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003), p. 277. 
34 Hayes and Guardino, op. cit., S. Murray, op. cit. 
35 Mikhail Alexseev and Lance Bennett, “For Whom the Gates Open: News Reporting and Government Source 
Patterns in the United States, Great Britain and Russia”, Political Communication, Vol. 12, No. 4 (1995), p. 
397, Althaus, et. al., op. cit., p. 412, Beverly Horvit, “Global News Agencies and the Pre-War Debate: A 
Content Analysis”, in Ralph Berenger (ed.), Global Media go to War: Role of News and Entertainment Media 
During the 2003 Iraq War, by Ralph Berenger (Spokane: Marquette Books, 2004), pp. 73-83. 
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interest in overseas sources. But that is not the only causal mechanism the indexing 
hypothesis suggests. Power potentially matters, too. Journalists should seek out foreign 
sources not just to provide balance in times of domestic consensus, but also to reflect foreign 
leaders’ ability to influence events. Two types of influence should matter. Firstly, the 
influence an actor has over foreign policy decision-making in the journalist’s home state. 
Secondly, the influence they have over the international system as a whole. Like Putnam, 
Hayes and Guardino and Murray focus on policymaking dynamics at work in the United 
States. In the US, the key domestic decision-makers are also usually the most influential 
international actors. But elsewhere that is not the case. In the UK, for example, the Prime 
Minister exerts the greatest control over foreign policy decision-making, but the most 
powerful international actor is still the President of the United States. US journalists might 
only index their coverage to international actors when domestic elites agree, in other words, 
but journalists elsewhere should look abroad more frequently. Similar discrepancies should 
occur between pairs of states with different international power capabilities, though the US 
and UK have a particularly close relationship.   
 This ‘international indexing’ hypothesis potentially affects how the two-level game 
model operates outside the United States because of what it means for reverberation. Putnam 
did not consider the possibility that reverberation might vary structurally between states. He 
may not have thought foreign voices had much of a chance to influence domestic political 
bargains, even if they did gain access to the domestic arena. Similarly, he may not have 
anticipated that international power differentials might affect domestic bargaining structures 
in this way. Even if Putnam anticipated the international indexing effect, he may still not 
have placed great emphasis upon it. Foreign policy analysts generally downplay the media’s 
ability to affect decision-making. But as Hayes and Guardino and Murray show, foreign 
voices can access domestic bargaining games, even in the US, and they can affect actual 
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policymaking36. This can be a direct process, with foreign voices shaping actual decision-
making stages. Winston Churchill’s famous speech lamenting the establishment of the “iron 
curtain” offers an example37. It can also be indirect. Policymakers treat media coverage as an 
indicator of public attitudes and as a potential influence on public opinion, something they 
generally do care about38.  
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD 
 
 This study investigates whether the UK news media cites US foreign policy decision-
makers more frequently than the US news media cites UK decision-makers in their coverage 
of international events involving both states. It aims to suggest how the hypothesised 
international indexing effect might affect transatlantic relations. It aims furthermore to say 
something about the significance for the two-level game approach of variations in 
reverberation among states. It is accordingly designed with both objectives in mind. It 
employs an across-time comparative structure, covering the conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq and 
Libya. This should help show whether the apparent reverberation experienced in the UK at 
the time of the Iraq invasion derived from the particular circumstances of the conflict or from 
more structural factors. It also directly compares media coverage in Britain and the United 
States.  This should help show whether levels of reverberation do in fact vary. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                         
36 Hayes and Guardino, op. cit., S. Murray, op. cit. 
37 Winston Churchill, “The Sinews of Peace”, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946. Available at 
http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1946-1963-elder-statesman/120-the-sinews-of-peace 
(retrieved 7 December 2015).  
38 Philip Powlick, “The Sources of Public Opinion for American Foreign Policy Officials”, International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1995), pp. 433-435, Robert Entman, Projections of Power (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2004), p. 21, T. Knecht and M.S. Weatherford, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages 
of Presidential Decision-Making”,  International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 50, No. 3 (2006), pp. 705-727. 
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Case selection 
 
 Naturally an account aimed in part at explaining how domestic foreign policy 
decision-making dynamics in Britain differ from those in the US should focus on Britain and 
the US. There are, however, further good reasons for studying international indexing using a 
US-UK comparison. To begin with, the two states are quite similar, at least in terms of 
variables likely to affect reverberation. Both are democracies possessed of vibrant, diverse 
domestic media environments. Both rank among the sixty-three free media states identified 
by Freedom House 39 . Media freedom matters, as unfree media are less likely to treat 
independence as a virtue and less able to cite sources critical of domestic governments. 
Britain and the US share a language, along with twenty other free media states. Language 
barriers can reduce the cross-border communicability of leaders’ statements. The two are also 
allies, sharing a comparable view of the world. They are likely to participate in similar 
foreign policy initiatives, for similar reasons and at similar times. This makes it less likely 
that any variation we identify might derive from substantive policy differences. It also links 
our analysis back to Walt’s discussion of penetration, and its significance for alliance 
cohesion. Alongside Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Tonga, Canada and the Republic of 
Ireland have free media, speak English and are allied to the United States. Only Britain, 
however, joined the US in all three of the conflicts covered by this study.  
 There are two main substantive differences between Britain and the US in two-level 
game terms. To begin with, Britain’s usual mode of strong single-party parliamentary 
government looks quite different to the US system, with its strict separation between 
branches of state. While Congress theoretically reserves the right to decide when the US 
takes military action abroad, parliament (also theoretically) has no formal role in such 
                                                        
39  Freedom House, “Freedom of the Press Index” (2014), available: http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-
types/freedom-press#.U1jRD_ldXTo (accessed 6 October 2015). 
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decisions 40. Parliament’s recent acquisition of conventional powers to influence military 
deployment decisions has changed the British system in the US direction, however, even as 
US presidents have increasingly found ways to circumvent congressional oversight. A British 
Prime Minister who commits to military action at the international level still has to navigate a 
difficult domestic political balancing act to implement what they propose41. Putnam argues 
that the specific mechanisms through which the domestic ratification stage of his model 
operates matter less than the fact some sort of bargaining takes place42. Accordingly we can 
recognize the greater theoretical divergence and practical similarity between US and UK 
processes (at least as far as military action is concerned), while also bracketing it for now.  
 Secondly, Britain and the US differ in terms of their place in the international political 
order. Here, again, there are some similarities. Both possess nuclear weapons. Both hold 
permanent seats on the UN Security Council as members of the victorious coalition in the 
Second World War. Other states expect Britain to behave like a “great power”43, a status it 
sometimes claims for itself, and one the US unambiguously holds. Britain is, at the same 
time, considerably less materially powerful than the US44. Comparing the two makes sense 
because international power status is the independent variable in the international indexing 
effect. At the same time, the gap between the US and UK is narrower than the gap between 
the US and most other comparable states. To an extent, then, this is a “least likely” 
comparison in George and Bennett’s terms45. If levels of reverberation vary between the US 
and the UK, we should expect to see at least as much variation between the US and other 
                                                        
40 Rosara Joseph, The War Prerogative: History, Reform and Constitutional Design. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013. 
41 Strong, op. cit. 
42 Putnam, op. cit., p. 436. 
43 Justin Morris, “How Great is Britain? Power, Responsibility and Britain's Future Global Role”, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2011), pp. 326-347, Jamie Gaskarth, British 
Foreign Policy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2013), p. 94.  
44 SIPRI, “Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2013), available: 
http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/milex_database (accessed 23 May 2014). 
45 Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Design in the Social Sciences (Boston: MIT 
Press, 2005), pp. 73-88. 
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states. Given the forces driving reverberation should be consistent, we should also see a 
similar effect at work between pairs of similarly mismatched states.  
 
Method 
 
 It is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the exact moment when leaders make foreign 
policy decisions. It becomes even more complicated when trying to compare different 
decision-making processes between states. If one state makes a decision significantly earlier 
than another, as the US arguably did when Congress voted President Bush the authority to 
invade Iraq in October 2002, five months before the House of Commons gave Tony Blair the 
same, it is difficult to isolate confounding factors that might upset a direct comparison. This 
study accordingly follows the majority of similar works by focusing on the weeks 
immediately preceding and following the actual start of three recent military campaigns46. It 
does this in the belief that the actual order to go to war marks a crucial decision moment, an 
opportunity to reverse even a well-entrenched policy position. Specifically, it analyses US 
and UK media coverage during three two-week periods centred on 7 October 2001, 19 March 
2003 and 19 March 2011, the starting points for the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and for 
the imposition of the NATO no-fly zone over Libya.  
 Two newspapers of record, the Times of London and the New York Times, provide 
source materials. The two are sufficiently similar to justify their use in a comparative account 
because they share a broadsheet format and play roughly equivalent roles in domestic media 
markets. Neither pursues a strong ideological stance. Both explicitly distinguish between 
news coverage and commentary. Both help lead the national news agenda. Newspaper 
coverage, in turn, serves as a proxy for media coverage overall. This is again standard                                                         
46 Craig Murray, Katy Parry, Piers Robinson and Peter Goddard, “Reporting Dissent in Wartime: British Press, 
the Anti-War Movement, and the 2003 Iraq War”,  Journal of Communication, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2008), p. 14, 
Matthew Baum and Tim Groeling, “Shot by the Messenger: Partisan Cues and Public Opinion Regarding 
National Security and War”, Political Behavior, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2008), p. 159, Hayes and Guardino, op. cit., p. 
29. 
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practice in studies of media influence during conflict situations. It is theoretically defensible 
on the grounds that newspapers tend to provide more detail and more source citations per 
story than television or social media reports. Anything that appears in a newspaper should 
appear on television or online.  
 A Lexis Nexis search for articles featuring the keywords ‘Afghanistan’, ‘Iraq’ and 
‘Libya’ during the three respective time periods generated a research corpus for this study 
comprising 1,778 individual texts. The search had downsides. It is difficult to identify where 
a particular news story appeared in the physical newspaper edition. This is unfortunate, since 
arguably more prominently-placed coverage can exert greater public influence. At the same 
time it is a necessary compromise to make the source materials manageable. The article does 
not intend to comment on how much influence foreign voices actually exerted, only to show 
where they enjoyed greater access, through the media, to domestic public debates. The issue 
of placement is therefore less important than the question of whether and how frequently 
different actors appeared at all.  
 Two independent coders analysed the research corpus manually, using the software 
package Atlas.ti to record source citations, coded by functional role (e.g. government, 
civilian, media, elected representative, etc.) and nationality. Atlas.ti allows coders to mark up 
documents on-screen, and enables researchers to generate summary statistics from coded 
documents without having to manually count the number of individual items coded. This 
remains a manual approach, in other words, but one that makes use of technology to facilitate 
data collection. A primary coder assessed all 1,778 documents across the three conflicts and 
two publications. A secondary coder separately assessed a random sample of documents 
using a codebook developed by the primary coder. An inter-coder reliability check using 
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Krippendorff’s alpha47 found inter-coder agreement scores of 0.73 for source type and 0.97 
for source nationality. A content analysis frame is generally considered very highly reliable at 
agreements levels of 0.90 and above, highly reliable at levels of 0.80 and above and 
acceptable at levels of 0.66 and above48. The results are therefore acceptably reliable for 
source type and very highly reliable for source nationality.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Summary statistics 
 
 
<Table 1> 
 
Table 1 describes the overall distribution of articles identified by the search process 
and source citations highlighted by the primary coder. Some differences emerge at this 
descriptive level. The New York Times carried a greater number of relevant articles overall. It 
also featured a greater number of source citations per article published. This may be evidence 
of a difference in approach not previously identified, with the New York Times featuring more 
stories than the Times, or possibly stories of greater length. This is potentially significant if 
foreign sources are indeed considered less important than domestic sources in general. The 
opportunities for their inclusion are greater in longer stories featuring more source citations 
overall. This difference, in other words, should skew the results away from what we would 
expect from an international indexing perspective. If the results support this study’s 
hypothesis, we can reasonably infer that they underplay the degree of foreign reverberation in 
Britain. 
                                                        
47  Klaus Krippendorff, “Reliability in Content Analysis: Some Common Misconceptions and 
Recommendations”,  Human Communication Research, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2004), pp. 411-433. 
48 Martin Bauer, “Classical Content Analysis”, in Martin Bauer and George Gaskell, Qualitative Researching 
with Text, Image and Sound: A Practical Handbook (London: Sage, 2000), p. 144. 
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The distribution of stories across the three conflicts tells us something about the 
relative news values each publication held. Over sixty-three per cent of the combined corpus 
of US and UK articles analysed related to the start of the war in Iraq. Twenty-one per cent 
covered the invasion of Afghanistan, and sixteen percent the start of air operations against the 
Gaddafi regime. These combined figures, however, mask variations between US and UK 
publications. US journalists showed far more interest in Afghanistan than in Libya. Just ten 
per cent of the total New York Times corpus related to the latter conflict, compared to twenty-
three per cent of pieces gathered from the Times. These figures tell us two things. Firstly, 
they show that journalists on both sides of the Atlantic found Iraq far more interesting than 
Afghanistan or Libya. This likely reflects the larger scale of the military campaign in 2003, 
the fact it involved significant numbers of Western ground troops rather than just air power, 
and the greater levels of domestic political conflict it provoked. Secondly, they show that 
British and US journalists did not always agree on which international issues were most 
interesting. The British press apparently took a far greater interest in Libya than did its US 
equivalent. This may reflect variations in the attention the two states’ leaders paid to each 
conflict. Britain was more active in pressing for intervention in Libya than the US, for 
example, with President Obama “leading from behind”49. 
 
Source nationality 
 
Table 2 describes in a simplified form the distribution of sources by nationality across 
the two states for all three conflicts. It also provides mean figures for relative citation 
frequencies in each publication. For the purpose of this table, the ‘home state’ and ‘ally’ 
figures relate to coverage of US or UK-based sources, depending on the nationality of the 
publication. ‘Home state’ citation figures for the New York Times, for example, refer to US-
                                                        
49 Ryan Lizza, “The Consequentialist”, The New Yorker (2 May 2011). 
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based sources. The ‘target’ figures refer to sources based in the state subject to the particular 
military campaign (e.g. Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya respectively). 
 
<Table 2> 
 
 
Table 2 shows that both the Times and the New York Times cited ‘home state’ sources more 
frequently than those from any other state. The effect is more pronounced in the US than in 
the UK. In fact, ‘home state’ sources formed an absolute majority of all source citations in 
the New York Times. On average US sources made up 55%a of citations in New York Times 
stories across the period. This figure contrasts with the 36.5%b of Times citations that related 
to domestic sources. 
The relative significance of these figures appears more clearly in Figure 1. Here it is 
apparent that the US press cited US-based actors considerably more frequently than the UK 
press cited UK-based actors. The UK press, furthermore, cited US sources significantly more 
frequently than the US press cited UK sources. While on average US sources made up 
24.6%c of citations in Times stories, UK sources comprised just 4.8%d of citations in the New 
York Times. The transatlantic traffic in newsworthy information apparently flowed only one 
way. 
 
<Figure 1> 
 
 On one level, such a pattern is to be expected. The UK is smaller than the US, and a 
less significant player on the international stage. UK Prime Ministers do not necessarily 
influence US policy decisions. However, the results suggest there is more to it than that. 
Other than sources drawn from the target state for each conflict, UK sources appeared more 
frequently in US news coverage than those from any other state. US journalists thought UK 
actors were worth listening to, just not to the same extent that UK journalists listened to US 
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actors. In other words, these initial results strongly support the international indexing 
hypothesis. US actors gained access to domestic-level policy debates in Britain much more 
frequently than UK actors did to US debates.  
 Two additional points stand out from this initial set of data. Firstly, while both Hayes 
and Guardino and Murray found the main driver for US journalists citing foreign sources was 
their desire to present balanced coverage, a comparison of US source citations during these 
three conflicts suggests something else might be going on. Both studies focused on the Iraq 
War in particular because of the high levels of domestic elite agreement around President 
Bush’s planned invasion, hypothesizing that this domestic consensus would drive balance-
seeking journalists to look abroad. But US journalists actually cited foreign sources more 
frequently around the start of the more contentious Libyan intervention, having 
overwhelmingly preferred US sources at the start of the war in Iraq. Similarly, the highly 
contentious domestic debate in Britain over Iraq did not significantly affect UK journalists’ 
propensity to cite US-based sources. This suggests UK journalists were not primarily looking 
overseas in order to balance domestic consensus. It suggests instead that they believed US 
figures were influencing the development of the UK’s Iraq policy. They could not ignore 
what US policymakers said.  
 Secondly, the international power foreign actors wield is not the only plausible driver 
of journalists’ willingness to cover them. In some instances, foreign actors can directly affect 
domestic-level decision-making. This can happen when the domestic ratification process 
depends on UN Security Council Approval, for example, as decisions to use force abroad do 
in some states50. It can also happen when the particular foreign figures involved are already 
well known to domestic audiences51. Journalists are more willing to refer to foreign sources 
they do not need to introduce. Both dynamics could have affected the US media’s behaviour                                                         
50 Wagner, et. al., op. cit. 
51 Walt, op. cit., L. Bennett, “An Introduction to Journalism Norms”, op. cit., p. 378, S. Murray, op. cit. 
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during this period. It appears, however, that any such effects were minimal. UN approval 
came easily in Afghanistan, with slightly more difficulty in Libya. In the case of Iraq it did 
not come at all. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was well known in the US, especially after 
9/11. David Cameron’s profile is much lower. If the prospect of direct foreign influence over 
US policymaking, or the question of US audiences’ familiarity with foreign actors, proved a 
defining factor in terms of how much attention the US media paid to foreign sources, we 
would expect fewer foreign source citations during the Libya conflict than during 
Afghanistan and Iraq. In fact the opposite was the case. This again likely reflects the Obama 
administration’s preference for leading from behind. US journalists had to cite foreign 
sources when writing about Libya because US leaders had too little to say. At the same time, 
it suggests that the differences observed between the US and UK cannot be explained solely 
on the basis of the media’s knowledge of particular leaders, nor with reference to the specific 
policies discussed. 
 
Source category 
 
 
<Table 3> 
 
A further possibility is that the US and UK media simply adopt different source-
selection strategies. In order to gauge this possibility, Table 3 presents summary statistics 
showing the distribution of sources according to functional category. The figures look far 
more similar than they do for citations by nationality. Government sources featured 
prominently on both sides of the Atlantic. Across the three conflicts, they comprised 57%e of 
Times citations on average, and 53.1%f of those in the New York Times. Much of the 
difference between these two figures is attributable to the US press practice of citing 
television coverage rather than speaking to officials directly. This practice was either less 
common or less commonly acknowledged in the UK. NGOs are more prominent in US 
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coverage in large part because the category includes think tanks, and the US has a wider 
range of such institutions.  
Elected representatives feature more in UK news coverage because of differences in 
the structure of the political systems in the two states. The US Congress gave authority for 
military action in October 2002, after which US media (entirely in line with the indexing 
hypothesis) lost interest in what elected representatives had to say52. Britain’s parliament 
gave its consent only the day before the invasion started, hence why 14.5%g of sources in 
Times coverage of Iraq were MPs. Generally speaking, then, journalists on opposite sides of 
the Atlantic appear to employ similar source-selection strategies. Where differences arise in 
the data they are largely explained by dissimilarities between the two political systems. This 
suggests in turn that the variation seen in the citation of sources by nationality does not relate 
to fundamental differences in how US and UK journalists work. 
 
Interacting category and nationality  
 
 The results presented thus far suggest that UK and US journalists adopt essentially 
similar source-selection strategies, driven by their professional desire to demonstrate 
independence and credibility. In line with the international indexing hypothesis, this common 
approach leads UK journalists to cite non-UK sources more frequently than US journalists 
cite non-US sources. We will now take an additional analytical step. Since we are interested 
primarily in policymakers’ ability to influence foreign domestic bargaining games, we need 
to gauge the interaction between source nationality and category.  
 
<Table 4> 
 
                                                         
52 Hayes and Guardino, Influence from Abroad, op. cit., p. 14. 
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Table 4 shows the proportion of total government source citations in each publication, 
broken down by source nationality. As expected, both UK and US journalists generally cited 
domestic officials more frequently than foreign officials. Domestic officials are better placed 
to influence domestic-level decision-making, so this makes sense. A US journalist writing 
about US foreign policy will naturally base their coverage on what the White House, State 
Department and Pentagon say. Over 30%i of all source citations appearing in US press 
coverage of the three conflicts derived from the US government. The figures for the Times, 
however, are more complicated. While on average it featured UK official sources more than 
foreign official sources, the picture is not consistent. UK press coverage of the conflict in 
Afghanistan featured US official sources (19.1%j of total citations for the period) more 
frequently than UK official sources (16.5%h). 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
Figure 2 highlights the contrast between US and UK coverage more clearly. The New 
York Times cited US official sources more frequently than official sources from all other 
states combined. While UK official sources appeared more frequently than those of any other 
single foreign nationality in Times coverage, they did not make up an absolute majority of 
official citations. For all three conflicts, the citation of ‘home’ official sources outweighed 
that of ‘non-home’ official sources in US coverage. In the UK the opposite was the case. 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
These results show strong support for the international indexing hypothesis. This in 
turn suggests that reverberation can hold greater significance in states other than the United 
States. This section considers two related analytical points. Firstly, it looks at whether the 
results are likely to recur in similar situations, either for future interactions involving the US 
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and UK or, more ambitiously, those comprised of different pairs of states. This speaks to the 
question of whether the variation observed reflects an aberration or the norm. Secondly, this 
section considers how the application of the two-level game model in non-US settings might 
be revised slightly to take these findings into account.  
 
Aberration or norm 
 
 Britain’s policies towards Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya were hardly its own. It did not 
act independently. It did not have the capacity to act independently. As Walt suggests, the 
fact two states work in partnership can affect the levels of penetration between them53. 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to believe the dynamics seen in the cases covered by 
this study should recur when the US and UK interact in future. These findings may also be 
generalizable to comparable interactions amongst allies. For one thing, the US and UK 
played a range of different roles with regard to each other and to the international system as a 
whole across the three conflicts, while the underlying patterns in the data remained the same. 
The US lead the way into Afghanistan and Iraq. It was dragged somewhat reluctantly to 
Libya by Britain and France. Britain was the only significant US ally in 2003. It was one 
coalition member among many in 2001 and 2011. From an indexing theory perspective, we 
would expect these different roles to be reflected in UK news coverage, as the relative 
influence of the US and UK will vary depending on which state is setting the agenda and on 
the width of the overall coalition of support. Figure 3 sets out the likely outcomes. 
 
<Figure 3> 
 
 
If the US leads a broad coalition, as it did during the initial attack on Afghanistan in 
2001, indexing should mean the UK’s role is downplayed while US leaders are featured 
                                                        
53 Walt, op. cit. 
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prominently. This is indeed what happened. As Table 4 shows, the Times cited US officials 
more frequently than their UK counterparts during the two week period surrounding the start 
of the campaign against the Taliban. If the US leads a narrow coalition, as it did when 
invading Iraq, the UK role should be highlighted while US leaders remain prominent. Again 
the results in Table 4 bear out this prediction, with UK officials gaining greater coverage 
while US officials lose out. If the US is drawn somewhat reluctantly into a broad coalition, as 
it was in taking action in Libya, both US and UK leaders should feature less prominently in 
UK media coverage. This is because neither will appear as the primary force driving the 
wider policy. The data bear this expectation out to some extent. Obama administration figures 
gained almost as much coverage during the start of the Libya intervention as their Bush 
administration predecessors managed in 2003. The scale of British domestic opposition to 
intervention in Iraq likely explains part of the difference. The underlying trend in UK media 
coverage towards citing US-based sources probably accounts for the remainder. While the 
predicted variations do mostly occur, they are fairly small. The real picture is one of stability, 
with US officials’ access to the UK domestic arena via the press vastly exceeding that their 
UK counterparts enjoy. The consistency between the conflicts, despite their differences, is 
such that we can reasonably infer that similar patterns should occur in future cases. This is 
not an aberration in terms of how the two-level game works in terms of transatlantic 
relations, in other words. It is the normal state of affairs. 
In terms of the implications of these findings for other states, here the key thing to 
note is that the driving force behind indexing is power54. Power is an attribute of all states. 
They differ not in kind, but in degree. We would not expect the relationships among different 
pairs of states to mirror exactly that between the US and UK, which are particularly 
interdependent allies and which share a language. But we can make certain projections on the 
                                                        
54 L. Bennett, “Toward a Theory of Press-State Relations” op. cit. 
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basis of these findings. The first relates back to the study’s ‘least likely’ comparative design. 
The power differential between the US and UK is smaller than that between the US and most 
other states. Since it appears to cause significant variations in terms of the levels of 
reverberation the two experience, we can project that weaker states than the UK will 
experience similar or greater levels of US reverberation, all else being equal. 
 Our second projection is more ambitious and more tentative. Reverberation occurs 
less frequently in the US than it does in other states because the US is the most powerful 
player in the international system. Even in the US, however, a degree of international 
indexing occurs. US journalists think US officials are better placed than officials from any 
other state to influence world affairs, at least as far as they matter from a US domestic 
perspective. But they recognize that foreign officials matter on occasion. The US is not 
unique, in other words. The forces driving foreign source selection in the UK also arise in the 
US. This implies that the variation reported here between US and UK source selection 
practices derives from the transatlantic power differential rather than from anything unique to 
the US-UK context. This in turn implies that international indexing should lead to different 
levels of reverberation between any unequal pairs of states. The absolute levels will likely be 
lower, since the US-UK relationship is unusually strong. There will be variation as a result of 
other factors, including the specific form of interaction in a given issue area, and language 
barriers. But power differentials should play an underlying role. Whether this is in fact the 
case is a question for future empirical work.  
 
Implications for the two-level game model 
 
 We have seen that Putnam’s model downplays the possibility of variation in the levels 
of reverberation experienced by different states. We have seen how greater reverberation 
grants foreign leaders direct access to, and so at least potentially influence over, the domestic 
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ratification process. Within the US, where reverberation is at its least significant, there is 
probably no need to modify Putnam’s formulation to grant it greater prominence. But beyond 
the US we probably should do more to take it into account.  
 
 
<Figure 4> 
 
 
<Figure 5> 
 
 
 Figure 4 describes the two-level game model as Putnam conceived of it. The two 
arenas are linked through the person of the policymaker. Governments simultaneously 
interact with each other in the international arena, and with their respective publics at home. 
Figure 5 proposes a revised model that takes the impact of international indexing on levels of 
reverberation between the US and UK into account. It is similar to Moravscik’s prominent 
summary of the theory, albeit with reverberation featuring more as a structural dimension and 
less as a policymakers’ tool55. UK leaders still play a two-level game, but their bargaining 
partner’s actions at the international level directly affect the domestic. US leaders, 
meanwhile, play a three-level game at domestic, international and foreign domestic levels. 
They can choose to ignore the fact they influence foreign domestic bargaining directly. But, 
as Donald Rumsfeld found, that direct influence can have damaging international-level 
consequences. If the US wants to work with weaker allies, it needs to take their domestic 
sensibilities into account. Otherwise it risks making international-level agreements, and 
successfully selling them at home, but undermining its partners’ domestic ratification 
processes. For the two-level game model to capture fully the dynamics confronting leaders of 
different states, it needs to take more fully into account the possibility that reverberation 
varies in a reasonably predictable fashion between states. 
                                                        
55 Moravscik, op. cit., p. 32.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 The two-level game model is highly effective in a number of ways. Although it is 
somewhat US-centric, many of its US-centric points can safely be bracketed when we 
consider other states. Putnam’s US-style account of how domestic ratification follows 
international agreements can be generalized into an assumption that international activities 
have domestic political consequences 56 . Britain’s parliament may not have the right to 
approve international agreements, for example, but it does have the right to throw the 
government out of office if it cannot stomach something it has done. Every time the British 
government makes a new agreement without facing significant parliamentary opposition, 
parliament can be said implicitly to have concurred. This is not exactly how Putnam presents 
his argument57. But it is sufficiently similar that we can treat the difference as one more of 
substance than of style. 
At the international level, meanwhile, different structural constraints such as military 
and politico-economic alliances only disrupt two-level game bargaining to the extent they 
themselves involve two-level games. Again we can regard Putnam’s focus on bilateral 
relationships to the exclusion of multilateral interactions and multiple simultaneous bilateral 
interactions as a necessary simplification of a complex reality. The fact Putnam does not 
consider how international bargaining situations differ among states reflects the US-centric 
nature of his approach. It does not, however, render it invalid.  
The effect of international indexing on reverberation is a little more problematic. This 
study finds that leaders of powerful states may be disproportionately able to access domestic 
political debates in less powerful states, at least when matters of foreign policy are 
concerned. This causes reverberation to take on greater significance beyond the United 
                                                        
56 Putnam, op. cit., p. 434. 
57 Ibid., p. 436. 
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States. This in turn raises implications for how the US itself (and potentially any relatively 
powerful state dealing with weaker counterparts) makes foreign policy, since it brings them 
influence over foreign domestic bargaining games whether or not they seek it out. It is a 
structural pattern underpinned by the processes by which journalists select news sources. It is 
driven by their professional preference for balanced coverage based on the statements of 
influential sources. It should arise regardless of individual actions or the specifics details of 
particular policies, which in turn is why the results of this study look similar across the three 
conflicts covered. The findings presented here relate specifically to the UK in its interactions 
with the US. Similar dynamics should hypothetically operate wherever states of unequal 
capabilities interact, though further work is needed to determine if this is in fact the case. 
News coverage ensures foreign leaders directly penetrate domestic politics. This 
occurs even in the US itself. It should be far more pronounced in smaller states, even states 
that are otherwise quite similar to the US such as the UK. Access does not necessarily 
translate into policy influence. But it does bring influence over the media and public opinion. 
It is a necessary if not sufficient condition for foreign actors to shape the behaviour of a state. 
The discrepancies observed in this study mean that the structure of domestic bargaining 
games can vary according to the distribution of power at the international level. Whether a 
state faces direct foreign access to, and so potential influence over, its domestic politics, and 
whether a state can potentially exert a direct influence over foreign domestic politics, appears 
to depend at least in part on the relative international positions of bargaining states. It is not 
just the attributes of the players that vary among states, in other words, but potentially also 
the rules of the domestic ratification game. 
In addition to its specific contributions on both the empirical and conceptual sides, 
this study has shown the value for Foreign Policy Analysis of recognizing that the US 
occupies a unique position at the pinnacle of the international political order. Putnam 
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intended that his model should apply universally, and it has been applied fruitfully across a 
range of cases58. He nevertheless, and likely unintentionally, downplayed to some extent the 
significance of factors that matter less in the US than they do elsewhere. International 
indexing should in theory cause varying levels of reverberation between pairs of unequally 
powerful states. This article has presented some empirical evidence supporting this 
hypothesis in the particular case of US-UK military co-operation. For the US there are no 
more powerful states, so in Putnam’s model reverberation looks like a constant presence. 
Putnam’s ‘boundedness’ on this count makes his model more parsimonious. But it also 
makes it less effective, even for studying the US. US leaders bargain domestically in line 
with Putnam’s assumptions. But they also influence foreign domestic arenas directly, more so 
than leaders elsewhere. They have considerable opportunities but face significant risks as a 
result. Comparing US and non-US dynamics can reveal both.  
 
  
                                                        
58 See several of the chapters in Peter Evans, Harold Jacobson and Robert Putnam (Eds.) Double-Edged 
Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993). 
 30 
Table 1. Summary statistics showing total articles analysed and sources identified. 
 
Conflict State Publication Articles Sources Sources per article 
Afghanistan US New York Times 202 869 4.3 UK Times 168 431 2.6 
Iraq US New York Times 703 2044 2.9 UK Times 421 1009 2.4 
Libya US New York Times 108 404 3.7 UK Times 176 318 1.8 
Total US New York Times 1013 3317 3.3 UK Times 765 1758 2.3 
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Table 2. Summary statistics showing distribution of sources by nationality.  
 
Conflict  Afghanistan Iraq Libya Mean 
Newspaper nationality US UK US UK US UK US UK 
Publication NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times 
Source  
nationality 
Home state 0.504 0.313 0.692 0.504 0.453 0.274 0.550a 0.364b 
Target 0.133 0.241 0.080 0.099 0.235 0.265 0.149 0.202 
Ally 0.056 0.262 0.058 0.240 0.030 0.237 0.048d 0.246c 
Others 0.306 0.183 0.170 0.157 0.283 0.224 0.253 0.188 
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Table 3. Summary statistics showing distribution of sources by category.  
 
Conflict Afghanistan Iraq Libya Mean 
Newspaper nationality US UK US UK US UK US UK 
Publication NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times 
Source 
category 
Government 0.564 0.536 0.509 0.553 0.520 0.622 0.531f 0.570e 
Civilian 0.193 0.167 0.200 0.169 0.088 0.098 0.160 0.145 
Media 0.068 0.060 0.138 0.084 0.148 0.038 0.118 0.061 
Representative 0.029 0.072 0.047 0.145g 0.038 0.044 0.038 0.087 
Rebel 0.051 0.088 0.000 0.000 0.095 0.114 0.049 0.067 
Ex-government 0.039 0.035 0.021 0.021 0.035 0.060 0.032 0.039 
NGO 0.023 0.037 0.048 0.018 0.053 0.022 0.041 0.026 
Academic 0.033 0.005 0.037 0.011 0.023 0.000 0.031 0.005 
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Table 4: Summary statistics showing distribution of government sources by nationality, as a 
proportion of all sources. 
 
Conflict Afghanistan Iraq Libya Mean 
Newspaper nationality US UK US UK US UK US UK 
Publication NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times NYT Times 
Source 
nationality 
Home state 0.319 0.165h 0.343 0.240 0.261 0.184 0.308i 0.197 
Target 0.026 0.058 0.025 0.034 0.070 0.079 0.041 0.057 
Ally 0.051 0.191j 0.035 0.175 0.013 0.171 0.033 0.179 
Others 0.168 0.121 0.105 0.101 0.176 0.187 0.150 0.136 
Total official citations 0.564 0.535 0.508 0.550 0.520 0.621 0.532 0.569 
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of summary statistics for source nationality. 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of government source citations by nationality, home versus non-home 
state. 
 
Figure 3. Matrix showing predicted impact of international indexing on UK news coverage 
depending on conflict type.  
 
Figure 4: Two-level game model. 
 
Figure 5: How international indexing distorts the two-level game. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
